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Chapter 3 
Towards a theory of hybrid organizations 
David Billis 
Introduction 
Hybrid organizations are ubiquitous. They are international, multi-sector phenomena 
and their unclear sector accountability often engenders unease and distrust. And in our 
area of concern we appear to have stumbled into a period of intense organizational 
hybridity in which we appear to be drifting up the (welfare hybrid) creek not only 
without a paddle, but also without a reliable map. Expressed in a somewhat more 
scholarly fashion the first priority in the preliminary agenda of issues laid out in 
Chapter 1 is the need to develop ‘tentative theories’ (Popper, 1972) of hybrid 
organizations. 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to begin to get to grips with the 
agenda of questions. It is laid out as a ‘building blocks’ exercise and contains five 
parts. 
 
1. Any study of hybridity must inevitably begin by establishing the nature of the ‘non-
hybrid’ state of the phenomenon. This first part explores the position in the public and 
private sectors which are more readily understood and well established than the third 
sector. At the heart of the model is an approach to ‘ownership’ in terms of decision-
making accountability that is intended to be applicable to all three main sectors. 
2. This part develops a similar model for the third sector. Reflecting on previous 
research it is suggested that the archetypal characteristics of the Third Sector 
Organization (TSO) are most closely found in the associational form of organization. 
A new approach to membership and ownership leads to a re-evaluation of the role of 
some paid staff in the association. 
3. The third, pivotal level proposes a ‘principal sector’ hypothesis which is intended 
to resolve the paradox of strong sectors in the midst of the growth of hybrid types. 
The centrepiece of this part is a model of sectors and their hybrid zones. 
4. The final level of analysis considers the nature of hybridity in the third sector. In 
order to do this, the concepts of ‘shallow’, ‘entrenched’, ‘organic’ and ‘enacted’ 
hybrids are introduced. 
5. The chapter concludes with a summary and a few thoughts as to how this approach 
to hybridity might prove helpful in thinking about the agenda of issues from Chapter 
1. 
Part one: Building an ideal model: The public and private 
sectors 
This part constructs an ideal type model of the public and private sectors. It opens by 
explaining how both ‘sector’ and ‘ideal type’ will be employed and follows this with a 
brief review of some of the previous research and a reconsideration of the nature of 
ownership. It concludes with a table which compares what are called the elements and 
principles of both sectors. 
Sectors and ideal types 
Sectors, in this chapter, are treated as collections of (non-hybrid) organizations. It is 
suggested that (a) all organizations have broad generic structural features or elements 
(such as the need for resources) but that (b) their nature and logic or principles are 
distinctly different in each sector. These principles have a logical interdependence 
and provide a coherent explanation for meeting objectives and solving problems. 
Together they represent the ‘rules of the game’ of the ideal model for each sector. 
For my purposes the model or ‘type’ must draw sufficiently from empirical 
reality so that it can be used in both practice and in policy-making. Following this 
broad (Weberian) approach, the ‘pure’ ideal type very rarely exists (Weber and 
Parsons, 1964). But, notwithstanding the wide variations in structures, organizations 
within each sector appear to derive their strength and legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) 
from the characteristics and rules of the game of their own distinctive ideal type. In 
reality, organizations within any sector, whilst adhering to the core principles, will 
vary in the degree to which they fully match the ideal model (Chapter 4). And 
individuals, particularly those in powerful roles or organizational positions, who can 
contribute to shaping hybridity, will encounter the tensions between the ideal type and 
organizational reality (Chapter 11). 
Core structural elements in the public and private sector 
My choice is selective and based on the search for the predominant structural features 
of organizations. Of particular importance is ‘the political economy’ approach of 
Wamsley and Zald (1976) who emphasise the role of ownership and funding in a 
comparative analysis of the public and private sectors. More than a decade later 
Bozeman reviewed the literature and concluded that studies comparing the structures 
in the two sectors ‘are uncommon’ (Bozeman, 1987, p. 24). In the same period, 
however, an extensive critique of the distinction between the sectors (Perry and 
Rainey, 1988) concluded by developing a typology of organizations based on (a) 
ownership, (b) funding and (c) mode of social control. The pioneering work of Perry 
and Rainey was extended by Koppell (Koppell, 2003) who in his exploration of quasi-
government hybrid organizations produces a ‘simplified typology of institutions’ 
which leaves only ‘ownership’ and ‘funding’ as the key variables (p. 11). A succinct 
but comprehensive review and analysis of management in the public and private 
sectors can be found in (Rainey and Chun, 2005). 
Summarising this selective dip into the literature and my own research (Billis, 
1991), it can be seen that the following five core elements persistently appear: 
(1) ownership 
(2) governance 
(3) operational priorities 
(4) human resources 
(5) other resources 
Clarifying the nature of ownership is essential if any model building that includes the 
third sector is not to be scuppered at the onset. The reason for this is, as Grønbjerg  
points out in her summary of the literature, that the third sector is usually regarded as 
not possessing ‘owners’ as usually defined (Grønbjerg, 2001). This is discussed in the 
following section. 
Revisiting the definition of ownership 
Economists have been energetic in defining ownership. An extensive study by 
Milgrom and Roberts claims that ‘the economic analyses of ownership have 
concentrated on two issues: the possession of a residual decision rights and the 
allocation of residual returns’ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, pp. 289–293). Their 
analysis is overwhelmingly focused – as are much of the other economic writings – on 
the for-profit firm. Consequently, it has been helpful to look at authors who have also 
taken a rather wider perspective including consideration of the third sector. 
Prominent amongst these authors is Hansmann who has approached the issue 
of ownership in nonprofits by raising the question of ‘ultimate control’, defined as 
‘the power to elect the board of directors’ (Hansmann, 1987, p. 28). In a later work he 
suggests that because of the ‘nondistribution constraint, a nonprofit firm, by 
definition, has no owners – that is, no persons who have a share in both control and 
residual earnings’ (Hansmann, 1996, p. 228). An important distinction is made 
between ‘formal control’ which is different from ‘effective control’ (p. 11). 
When faced by this distinctive problem of ownership in nonprofits 
Speckbacher introduces the idea of ‘key stakeholders who play the role of the “firm’s 
owners” [and] … should have the right to interpret the mission in controversial 
situations’ (Speckbacher, 2003, pp. 275–276). Ben-Ner and Jones link ownership and 
control more closely and extensively with organizational features which range from 
‘determination of the objectives of the organization’ through to how people ‘are 
induced to carry out their functions’ (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995, pp. 532–534). Chew 
and Osborne, in their analysis of strategic positioning in charities, also emphasise the 
influential role of stakeholders, particularly key organizational decision makers 
(Chew and Osborne, 2009, pp. 42–43). 
The following analysis picks up these threads of different layers of ownership, 
organizational decisions and stakeholders/members. The approach abandons residual 
returns as an essential feature of ownership that in any case does not seem persuasive 
for the public sector (Wamsley and Zald, 1976). Consequently, in this chapter, 
ownership is defined according to different levels of decision-making accountability 
(formal, active and principal) within the broad category of ownership. For the 
moment, the discussion is confined to the private and the public sectors. Here can be 
identified groups of people who have the ‘formal rights’ to elect the board of directors 
and political representatives respectively known as shareholders and the electorate. 
Nevertheless a sizeable percentage of this formal/legal ownership can be inactive. In 
reality they may have little interest or motivation to participate in any of the decision-
making activities of business or government. 
In both sectors people can be found within the formal ownership who (at least) 
do exercise their votes at the annual board meeting and who do vote in government 
elections. These can be regarded as active owners even if their influence on 
Hansmann’s small set of fundamental issues is slight. 
The third group are the principal owners: those who in effect can close the 
organization down and transfer it to another sector – what Weisbrod (1998) refers to 
as ‘conversion’ – or change the fundamental boundary and mission of the 
organization through mergers or other actions (Gray, 1997). In the private sector it 
may be large pension funds or other major investors. In the public sector it likely to be 
the elected representatives or a caucus of those representatives. 
With these definitions in mind, it is now possible to return to the main 
objective of this part: building an ideal type of the public and private sectors. 
Building the foundations: A model of the public and private sectors 
So far, five elements which might serve as a basis for building a model of the public 
and private sectors have been identified. Each element comes with a distinctive set of 
principles for each sector. In summarising these principles I can draw attention only 
to a few particularly relevant studies, for example, the works of Stewart and Ranson 
(Ranson and Stewart, 1994; Stewart and Ranson, 1988) which compare the rationale 
for management in the public domain to that in the private domain. They both discuss 
the elements and principles in the two sectors and contrast collective choice in the 
polity with individual choice in the market. 
What emerge are tentative models of 
A private sector which is (a) owned by shareholders and (b) governed according to 
the principle of size of share ownership, working according to (c) operational 
priorities driven by principles of market forces in individual choice, with typical (d) 
human resources consisting of paid employees in a managerially controlled firm and 
(e) other resources primarily from sales and fees. 
A public sector which is (a) owned by the citizens and (b) governed according to 
principles of public elections with work driven (c) by principles of public services and 
collective choice and as its typical (d) human resources consisting of paid public 
servants in legally backed bureaux and (f) resourced by taxation. 
The following part of the chapter will explore how the complexities of the third sector 
could be similarly developed into an ideal type. 
Part two: Developing a model for the third sector 
The objective of this part is to utilise the same five structural elements, discussed 
above, and to identify principles which are distinctly applicable to the third sector. 
The search for distinctive principles 
There is an impressive list of authors who have sought to uncover the sector’s general 
distinctive features (for example, Kramer, 1981; Young, 1983; Mason, 1984; Van Til, 
1988; O’Neill, 1989; Lohmann, 1992; Smith, 2000). (For an important comparative 
discussion of the public, private and what is called the ‘commons’ see Lohmann, 1992 
Chapter 2). Much of this literature has been summarised and analysed by Grønbjerg 
who identified five major attributes (1) private auspices (2) absence of formal 
ownership rights (3) volunteerism (4) particular missions and substantive goals and 
(5) the challenge of changing people (Grønbjerg, 2001). The extensive international 
mapping exercise undertaken by Johns Hopkins University (Salamon and Anheier 
1992) identified the key ‘common features’ as self-governing, nonprofit distribution, 
private and nongovernmental in basic structure and voluntary to ‘some meaningful 
extent’ (Salamon et al., 2000). 
Interestingly, a European analysis of social enterprises, despite the attempt to 
distance these ‘new entrepreneurial forms’ from the ‘more traditional’ third sector, is 
also compelled to rely on a similar set of characteristics (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 
2001, pp. 273–274). 
In sum, the literature highlights a number of principles which are seen to be 
distinctive. These include independence, use of voluntary labour, sensitivity and 
closeness to users and being mission driven. 
However, much of the research, as Smith (2000) points out, ignores the vast 
number of small grass roots organizations, a similar point made in a comprehensive 
review of community movements and local organizations (Cnaan and Milofsky, 
2008). Also, rather neglected in current third sector research are social movements 
(Davis, 2005) and, at the other end of the scale, many huge membership organizations 
such as the National Trust (which has 3.5 million members and 52,000 volunteers) let 
alone political parties. It is likely therefore that a more balanced overview of the third 
sector would give increased emphasis to the role of volunteers and the distinctive type 
of resources of these organizations. 
All this, in addition to the actual history of many organizations, indicates that 
an ideal type of the third sector is best typified by the association. In this model 
people establish a formal organization in order to resolve their own or other people’s 
problems. These members, through a process of private elections, elect committees 
and officers to guide the work of the organization. The organization may need 
additional volunteer labour to forward its policies. Other resources may also be sought 
and these are typically membership dues, donations and legacies. Work is driven 
neither by the need to make a profit nor by public policies but primarily by the 
association’s own agenda. This approach differs from most prevailing theoretical 
approaches to the sector. The association, rather than being a rather peripheral 
component (as in the Johns Hopkins research), is now seen as the ‘ideal model’ and 
source of the distinctive sector attributes (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). 
Nevertheless, in the development of a model comparable to the private and 
public sectors, one stumbling block still remains: the place of members and ‘owners’ 
in the third sector model. 
Ownership in membership associations 
A recent analysis notes that previous indictments regarding the absence of a 
compelling theory (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959; Knoke, 1986) ‘still hold today … … 
empirical research on governance and structure of non-profit membership association 
is thin’ (Tschirhart, 2006, pp. 534–535). Consequently, this section of the chapter 
explores whether the preceding analysis of different layers of owners helps in the 
model building of the sector. 
In the association, the gap between formal, active and principal owners may 
be small. However, even in small, tightly knit groups, it is possible to differentiate 
between those (formal members) who stay in the shadows (see Putnam (2000) for a 
seminal study); those who play an active part in committee and other activities; and a 
core group of those (principal owners) ‘who everybody knows’ will really be the key 
players in the defining moments of the group’s history. 
The distinctive characteristics of associations are the linkage and logical flow 
between its ownership by members, principles of governance, reliance on volunteer 
resources for its operational work and principles of membership accountability which 
together enable it to function as a robust and effective organization. Critically, 
although there may be clear differentiation in the roles of governing body, committees 
and volunteer workers, all will usually be part of the active and 
membership/ownership groups as defined. In addition, those receiving services may 
be past or present members, or have close links through family, neighbourhood, 
friendship and other groups. Active members will be dedicated to the cause which 
may be expressed tangibly both through financial contributions and through a 
preparedness to take on unpopular and sometimes unpleasant work, readiness to 
recruit others into the organization and, if necessary, advocacy – the determination to 
persuade those outside the group of the rightness of the mission. 
According to this approach, formal, active and principal member/owners can 
also be identified according to their different levels of accountability for decision-
making. 
The model of the three sectors 
Employing a decision-making approach to the issue of membership/ownership 
enables their core elements and principles to be laid out together with those of the 
private and public sectors in the form of a table (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Ideal type sectors and accountability  
CORE 
ELEMENTS 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
PRINCIPLES 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
PRINCIPLES 
THIRD SECTOR  
PRINCIPLES 
1. Ownership Shareholders Citizens  Members 
2. Governance  Share ownership size Public elections Private elections 
3. Operational 
Priorities  
Market forces and 
individual choice 
Public service and 
collective choice 
Commitment about 
distinctive mission 
4. Distinctive 
human resources 
Paid employees in 
managerially 
controlled Firm 
Paid public servants 
in legally backed 
Bureau 
Members and 
volunteers in 
Association  
5. Distinctive other 
resources 
Sales, fees Taxes Dues, donations and 
legacies 
 
 
 
 
According to this model, the ideal type ‘work doing’ operational units of the 
sectors are the firm, bureau and association.1 
Underpinning the model of sectors is the notion of accountability and the role 
of principal owners. By organizational accountability, I am referring to those 
individuals and groups (governing bodies of all sorts, and individuals) who have the 
authority to carry out their designated duties and can be held to account to higher 
level individuals and institutions if they fail to carry out those duties. 
Part three: Building a model of hybrid organizations 
Approaches to the study of hybridity 
Despite recent increased interest in hybrid organizations, the literature remains 
sparsely spread across many academic disciplines over several decades. In the 
absence of a systematic body of research, I have restricted myself to outline a few of 
the broad approaches that are particularly germane for this chapter. Many of the 
numerous studies of hybridity defy easy classification (see or example, Langton, 
1987; Powell, 1987; Hasenfeld and Gidron, 2005; Cooney, 2006). However, for ease 
of analysis, much of the disparate literature might be loosely grouped into three 
approaches. 
<list> 
1. A popular approach regards hybrid organizations as occupying points on a 
continuum between sectors (for example, Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Demone and 
Gibelman, 1989). 
2. Other writers have adopted what might be called a single sector emphasis. Here, 
their main concern is either with the public or private sector, and organizations on 
their boundary are usually studied from the perspective of the implications for one 
particular sector (Gray, 1990; Courpasson and Dany, 2003; Koppell, 2003; Skelcher 
et al., 2005). 
3. A few writers, mainly from continental Europe, appear to have gone one step 
further in a separate sector approach. For them, hybridization and hybrid 
organizations have replaced the sector metaphor and are now the permanent features 
in the welfare system (Brandsen et al., 2005; Evers, 2005). In an earlier paper, James 
(1983), although focusing on US nonprofits, seems to be arguing an almost similar 
case. 
</list> 
Reflecting on this emerging body of literature reinforces the contention made in 
Chapter 1 and the introduction to this chapter: any theory will need to (a) handle the 
paradox of a strong sector concept in a period of increased hybridity (b) cover all 
three sectors and (c) address the issue of accountability. 
The following section attempts to address these issues. 
The model of hybridity: The prime sector approach 
In this chapter, I shall take a different approach to those outlined in the previous 
section drawing on research that goes back some 30 years. Initially using the work of 
Edmund Leach on ambiguity (Leach, 1976), this early work can be tracked in Billis 
(1979; 1984a; 1984b). 
My working hypothesis is that organizations will have ‘roots’ and have 
primary adherence to the principles of one sector (Billis, 1991; 1993; 2003). This is 
based on the inherent contradictory distinctive and conflicting principles (rules of the 
game) for each sector outlined in Table 3.1. 
According to a prime sector approach, stakeholders and public policy makers 
need to be clear whether the organizations they are working with, and in, 
fundamentally adhere to the principles of accountability inherent in either the public, 
private or third sector. Thus, hybrids are not on a continuum but have a clear cut off 
point evident when principal owners take the boundary-shaping decisions (closures, 
conversions mergers etc.) according to the principles of the different sectors. 
But neither are hybrids a separate sector since there is no evidence that they 
have distinctive and explicit principles of management and operation which set them 
apart from other sectors. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the three sectors and their hybrid zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Third
Private
Public
The three sectors and their 
hybrid zones
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
 
Key: The hybrid zones 
1. Public/Third                                4. Third/Public                    7. Private/Public                                  
2. Public/Private/Third                   5. Third/Public/Private.       8. Private/Public/Third                                                                                   
3. Public/Private                             6. Third/Private                   9. Private/Third 
 
The model of the three sectors requires a few words of explanation. 
Firstly, the circles which represent sectors are not intended to reflect the size of 
resources or impact of these sectors in different countries. These clearly vary from 
country to country. 
Secondly, it can be seen that each sector may have three forms or zones of hybridity. 
Thirdly, the figure is unable to capture an important aspect of my argument: that is – 
whereas the move across sectors is a fundamental organizational decision – it is 
possible to slide into one or more of the nine hybrid zones. (See the later discussion 
on shallow and entrenched, and organic and enacted hybridity). 
Finally, just a few tentative examples (without explanation) from the public and 
private sectors may help a very modest fleshing out of the model and perhaps 
stimulate debate. Third sector examples can be found in other chapters of the book. 
Public/Third                     NHS Foundation Trusts  
Public/Private/Third         The BBC  
Public/Private                   Nationalised industries, Fannie Mae   
Private/Public                    Partnership UK (51 per cent private equity) 
Private/Public/Third          The National Lottery   
Private/Third                     The John Lewis Partnership 
 
Part four: The case of hybrid TSOs 
Although the issues discussed in this part of the chapter are likely to have counterparts 
in other sectors, the following discussion is restricted to some key theoretical and 
practical issues for the third sector raised by the prime sector approach to hybridity. It 
opens by distinguishing firstly between ‘shallow’ and ‘entrenched’ hybridity and 
secondly between ‘organic’ and ‘enacted’ hybrids. These sections are followed by a 
consideration of one of the chronic dilemmas of third sector theory: the role of paid 
staff. 
Shallow hybridity 
Hybridity in the third sector is not a new phenomenon. For many years, some 
organizations have moved into hybridity in a rather gentle fashion, causing minor 
disturbances, but not necessarily calling into question their basic third sector identity. 
The introduction of a modest form of hybridity often arises from the desire to 
maintain or perhaps extend the range of activities. Board members with a business 
background might be keen for more commercial approaches. For example, in one case 
study, the appointment of an NHS consultant led to pressure to work more closely 
with the health service. Resources and grants from government or business might be 
received to support the general purposes of the organization. 
Field work over several decades indicates that taking on the first paid staff (the 
typical human resources of the public and private sectors) can be felt as an important 
step into shallow hybridity for TSOs (Billis, 1984a). This can be uncomfortable but 
most TSOs appear to have survived this early discomfort and have preserved the 
integrity of their core missions. Initially, they may employ staff to handle their 
supporting non-operational activities. 
At some point, the organization may decide that it needs one, or even a few, 
paid staff to undertake operational work to meet the needs of its users. A special grant 
might be sought, or an appeal launched, and workers are recruited. Often, the first 
paid staff may themselves have been committed members, perhaps founders of the 
organization. Even where tensions arise between volunteer workers and those who get 
paid for the same work, this may still be regarded as belonging to the shallow form of 
hybridity. 
Entrenched hybridity in the third sector 
Whether planned at all or not, entrenched hybridity can arrive both at the (a) 
governance and (b) operational levels of organizations in all sectors. 
At the governance level, the board or other form of governing body may find 
itself compelled to, or under pressure to, accept permanent government or private 
sector representatives in return for resources and influence. 
More usually, entrenched hybridity in the third sector begins as a result of 
receiving private and public sector resources through grants, contracts and sales. 
These resources will increase and decrease according to political preferences and 
market forces but they may become sufficiently reliable that, together with third 
sector sources, they represent a flow of income adequate to maintain a structure of 
management. (But entrenched hybridity need not take this ‘organic’ route; it can 
arrive immediately through ‘enactment’ – see the following section). 
At the operational level, entrenchment arises when paid staff become 
dominant in the delivery of the operational work of the organization and a 
management structure with several hierarchical levels is established. Then the 
organization can be considered to have embedded into its structure core features of 
the firm and bureau. The rules of the game begin to change and associational 
principles have to coexist with alien principles drawn from the private and public 
sectors (see Table 3.1). This is because maintaining a structure of staff leads to 
increased pressure towards considerations of individual and organizational survival. 
Significant resources have increasingly to be secured often through the political 
process (that they meet public policy needs), and/or through the market principles of 
cost and price. 
Entrenched paid staff structures bring with them a different language and way 
of operation. People are then dependent on the organization for their livelihood and – 
quite naturally – hours and conditions of service, promotion and career development 
have to be accommodated. Formal job descriptions, managerial accountability, 
sanctions and reward systems all become daily features and replace the ‘group’ and 
‘committee’ as the prime ways of organizing and solving problems. It becomes 
increasingly likely that such structures are influenced by political and commercial 
priorities and activities. There are other possible consequences. Volunteers might 
wonder why others should receive payment, whilst they give their labour freely on the 
basis of belief and commitment (see Chapter 5). 
Although entrenched hybridity may increase the propensity for mission drift, I 
am far from arguing that this is inevitable. If third sector resources are themselves 
adequate, then entrenched hybrids can be established from within the sector itself. It 
seems reasonable to assume that despite the tensions that arrive with the introduction 
of employment hierarchies, this type of hybrid TSO will be less susceptible to mission 
drift. More importantly, paid staff may also be active or principal members/owners: 
an essential part of this analysis which is discussed shortly. 
Organic and enacted hybrids 
Much of the third sector literature has been occupied with organizations where 
hybridity has resulted from the steady accumulation of external resources. Over many 
years, organizations may have moved from shallow to entrenched hybridity. 
However, in this new era of frenzied organizational experimentation, there are a 
growing number of hybrid organizations that are enacted, that are established from 
day one as hybrids, usually by other organizations. 
A full analysis of enacted hybrids lies well beyond the scope of this chapter 
but we can note that – notwithstanding the recent upsurge – they have been around for 
many years. We need to think here only of the nationalised industries owned by 
government but operating in the market. 
Enacted hybrids arise for different reasons, in different sectors and under 
different broad headings. Although they may be seen as part of the broader category 
of numerous collaborative mechanisms across sectors (including partnerships, 
networks, project groups, joint ventures and joint operating groups), they are 
distinguished by the fact that they have an apparently independent, often legal, 
structure. Thus governments can create or sponsor new organizational forms (see 
Chapters 8 and 9), oil companies can collaborate with national governments in 
separate legal forms and TSOs can establish trading companies (Chapter 4). 
Enacted hybrids may present complex problems of accountability and later 
chapters will enter this territory. The only point that might be made in this chapter is 
to question the extent to which these arrangements are time-limited and the extent to 
which they affect the basic sector identity of individual organizations involved in the 
collaborations. 
Paid staff as members/owners? 
Another problem remains unresolved. The theoretical quandary is as follows. Hybrid 
TSOs are usually and increasingly dependent on paid staff and may have few if any 
‘formal members’, so how can these agencies be part of the third sector whose core 
principles, I have argued, are based on the association? In an attempt to resolve this 
apparent contradiction the nature of membership/ownership will be revisited. 
My argument is that in hybrid TSOs paid staff may also be part of the active 
membership by similarly (to other active members) demonstrating their genuine 
commitment to organizational purposes through their freely given and un-coerced 
contributions to the operations and governance of the organization. Thus, additional to 
their normal work role, they may undertake voluntary work or provide other 
resources. They may participate in committees and other governance activities. They 
may have a more flexible approach to precise hours of work flowing from a belief in 
the purposes of the organization. ‘Voluntary’ must mean what it says. As Bacchiega 
and Borzaga put it in their analysis of social enterprises ‘incentives for workers are 
not based exclusively on monetary rewards; rather, they derive mainly from workers’ 
involvement in shaping and sharing the organization’s goals and mission’ (Bacchiega 
and Borzaga, 2001, p. 274). 
Being part of the governance process is more than a consultation exercise in 
which staff opinions are solicited in order to help managers do their work. In contrast, 
in these meetings, the active TSO members combine their work role with a personal 
commitment to the cause to discuss broader organizational issues informally or 
perhaps in a more structured fashion. There is a degree of overlap and hybridity in 
their paid work and membership roles. 
From this pool of paid staff of active members, there may be those who are 
sufficiently committed and influential to be considered a natural part of the ownership 
of the organization which makes the critical decisions discussed earlier. 
Part five: Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter presented a tentative theory of hybrid organizations in order to facilitate 
a later discussion of the list of issues laid out in the introductory chapter. This 
concluding part summarises that general approach to hybridity and offers just a few 
thoughts on its relationship to the opening catalogue of issues. I have not attempted to 
draw conclusions about the possible implications for research, policy and practice. 
That task seems more appropriately undertaken after taking into account the lessons 
that emerge from Part II of the book. 
In view of the contested boundaries of the third sector, the chapter began the 
process of model building by drawing on research and literature from the private and 
particularly from the public sectors. The concepts of ‘element’ (present in all sectors) 
and ‘principles’ (distinctive sector rules of the game) were used in order to build a 
comparative model. It rapidly became clear that if a similar model were to be 
developed for the third sector, several intellectual challenges would need to be 
confronted. The first of these was the problem of ownership, a core component of 
these models. Applying the traditional economic definitions of ownership inevitably 
leads to the familiar conclusion that TSOs have no owners. Rather than abandon the 
concept in the model building, ownership was revisited and redefined in terms of its 
accountability for different levels of decision-making. Principal, active and formal 
owners were defined. Principal owners were seen to be those that take the major 
boundary shaping or strategic decisions. Approaching ownership in this way enabled 
the concept to be more realistically employed in the third sector model. 
The second challenge was to uncover an ‘ideal type’ of the third sector which 
possessed an equally robust set of core distinctive principles. After reflecting on the 
policy and research literature, the conclusion was reached that the positive attributes 
most frequently claimed for the sector were found in their most pristine form in the 
archetypal association. This does not mean that such groups are unproblematic 
utopian communities, or that they are the most significant players in public policy. 
Placing the association and its claimed virtues at the heart of the third sector is 
comparable to the powerful ideal models of the public and private sectors under 
whose own general principles can be found equally diverse groups of institutions. 
These two threads of argument (ownership and distinctive principles) and the 
proposition that organizations had primary accountability to the principles of one 
sector, led to the model presented in Table 3.1 and eventually to the depiction of 
hybrid organizations in Figure 3.1. 
In an attempt to get to grips more closely with the nature of hybridity, shallow 
was differentiated from entrenched states of hybrid TSOs. It was hypothesised that 
entrenchment is likely to be associated with the development of hierarchical levels of 
paid staff and the associated resource demands, usually from public and private sector 
sources. In the belief that these may prove to have different problems, it was 
suggested that it might be worth while differentiating organic from enacted types of 
hybrid – those established by other organizations. 
Finally, the chapter returned to what currently appears to be a central theme of 
the ‘optimistic–pessimistic’ debate, the position of large paid staff TSOs. I raised the 
possibility that based on the discussion about principal owners/members, paid staff 
may under certain circumstances be part of this group. 
Where relevant, following chapters will reflect on these concepts and explore 
their utility in the light of their own specific areas of study. Although the notion of 
overlapping sectors and zones is based on a long history of personal research, many of 
the concepts (‘the role of principal owners’, ‘shallow and entrenched hybridity’ and 
‘organic and enacted hybridity’) have had more limited testing. Those studies will 
also therefore present an opportunity to reflect on their potential usefulness in a wide 
range of third sector settings. 
I hope, therefore, that the discussions of ‘hybridity in action’ in Part II of the 
book make it possible to respond to most of the questions raised in the introductory 
chapter. To take just one example: who are the accountable owners of hybrids? 
This is one of the most pressing and puzzling questions for policy and 
practice. The decision-making approach to ownership – which was conceptualised in 
terms of principal, active and formal owners – was intended to help confront this 
question and assist in increasing transparency of accountability. 
This chapter has primarily concentrated on the organic hybrids with a single 
accountable ownership body. I think that a strong case can be made that if we can ask 
more penetrating questions and get closer to an answer about ownership in these 
forms of hybrid TSOs, this would represent a major step forward. Nevertheless, as 
noted earlier, there is a growing body of more complex TSOs with interlocking layers 
of ownership and accountability that remains to be explored. To complicate matters 
even further, the tendency to enact hybrid organizations appears also to be increasing, 
with the possibility of another distinctive set of issues and challenges. Some of the 
following case studies enter this territory, and again this may provide the opportunity 
to test and possibly further develop the ideas presented in this chapter. 
Notes 
1. In earlier publications, I have referred to the third sector as the Association sector. 
However, this has caused some confusion between the definition of the sector and its 
core organizational units. Other writers have met the same problem (Warren, M. 
(2001) Democracy and Association, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). 
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